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Philosophical Again:
On Philip E. Agre’s
Legacy
Jethro Masís
“So here I was in the middle of the AI world—not
just hanging out there but totally dependent on
the people if I expected to have a job once I
graduated—and yet, day by day, AI started to
seem insane. This is also what I do: I get myself
trapped inside of things that seem insane.” —
Philip E. Agre, RRE News and Recommendations
(7/12/2000)
Introduction
Philip Agre is a former professor of information
studies at the University of California, Los
Angeles, who was reported missing in October
2009. Concerned missing notes appeared widely
on the internet (Carvin 2009; Pescovitz 2009;
Young 2009; Rothman 2009) for he was presumed
to have had some kind of mental breakdown and
to be homeless somewhere in Los Angeles. In
January 2010 it was reported that he was found
alive and indeed “self-sufficient and in good
health” (Carvin 2010). However, he never returned
to academic life and explicitly asked his closest
friends to be left alone. And this is also how the
work of one of the most interesting theorists on
the relationship between the computer and
information sciences and the humanities faded
away. He was an internet scholar and a sort of
proto-inventor of web 2.0 (in the 1990s!) who
grew increasingly worried about the
consequences that communication technologies
were having on people’s privacy. Agre
theorized this with his usual shrewdness and
theoretical discernment (Agre 1994; Agre 1998).
People who ‘knew’ him, or at least who worked
close to him, describe Agre as a very reclusive
person who never really spoke about his personal
life. As reported by The Chronicle of Higher
Education  (Young 2009), Agre had not just gone
missing but had abandoned his job and his
apartment and he suffered from manic
depression.
When Agre was still missing, Michael Travers—a
computer scientist who met him in Graduate
School at MIT—summarized in a blog post
(Travers 2009) Agre’s significance for computer
studies and beyond. I think his words are worth
quoting at length:
Phil was one of the smartest people I knew in
graduate school. More than smart, he had the
intellectual courage to defy the dominant MIT
sensibilities and become not just an engineer but
also a committed critic of the ideology under the
surface of technology, especially as it was applied
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to artificial intelligence. He was a leader of the
situated action insurgency in AI, a movement that
questioned the foundations of the stale theories
of mind that were implicit in the computational
approach. Phil had the ability to take fields of
learning that were largely foreign to the culture of
MIT (continental philosophy, sociology,
anthropology) and translate them into terms that
made sense to a nerd like me. I feel I owe Phil a
debt for expanding my intellectual horizons.
Phil was a seminal figure in the development of
Internet culture. His Red Rock Eater email
list[1] was an early predecessor to the many on-line
pundits of today. Essentially he invented
blogging, although his medium was a broadcast
email list rather than the web, which didn’t yet
exist. He would regularly send out long
newsletters containing a mix of essays, pointers to
interesting things, and opinions on random things.
He turned email into a broadcast medium, which
struck me as weird and slightly undemocratic at
the time, but he had the intellectual energy to fuel
a one-man show, and in this and other matters
Phil was just ahead of the times.
This paper discusses some ideas envisioned by
Agre, particularly the ones concerning a critical
technical practice and the possibilities of making
this practice (AI, for instance) philosophical again.
Although I have Agre’s work in high regard, I shall
criticize his idea that finding the right technical
implementation for everyday practice can be
achieved under the rubric of programming
Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit. I am also appreciative
of Agre’s idea that there are certain metaphors
pervading technical work which must be taken
into account, but I will also argue that the
Heideggerian so-called Sichöffnende and Offene,
that is, the open character of human existence, is
precisely not amenable to programming and that
Agre could not get rid of the modern “technical
construction of the human being as machine”
(Heidegger Zoll, p. 178).  
 
Making AI Philosophical Again
Philip Agre received his doctorate in Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science at MIT, but he
was always more interested (than many of his
peers, that is) in exploring the philosophical
assumptions pervading technological
practices.[2] Thus, he deemed ‘mistaken’ to
consider the Cartesian lineage of AI ideas as
merely incidental and as having no purchase on
the technical ideas that descend from it (1997, p.
23). Quite on the contrary, argues Agre,
“computer systems are thus, among other things,
also philosophical systems—specifically,
mathematized philosophical systems—and much
can be learned by treating them in the same way”
(1997, p. 41). Agre claims “AI is philosophy
underneath” (2005, p. 155); an assertion he
clarifies in five points:
AI ideas have their genealogical roots in
philosophical ideas.
AI research programs attempt to work out
and develop the philosophical systems
they inherit.
AI research regularly encounters
difficulties and impasses that derive from
internal tensions in the underlying
philosophical systems.
These difficulties and impasses should be
embraced as particularly informative clues
about the nature and consequences of the
philosophical tensions that generate them.
Analysis of these clues must proceed
outside the bounds of strictly technical
research, but they can result in both new
technical agendas and in revised
understandings of technical research itself.
(idem)
Influenced heavily by Dreyfus’s pragmatization of
Heidegger, Agre too understands Sein und Zeit as
providing a phenomenology of ordinary routine
activities, and believes Heidegger’s Analytik des
Daseins can provide useful guidance for the
development of computational theories of
interaction. Most importantly, it can also
contribute to afford technical practice a historical
conscience it overtly lacks, since “research like
Heidegger’s can have its most productive
influence upon AI when AI itself recovers a sense
of its own historical development” (Agre 1996, p.
25). This last critical and historical trait permits
Agre, as a philosopher of computing, to
denounce that modern computational practices
can be viewed as the resolute incarnation of a
disembodied conception of philosophy having
Augustine, Descartes, and Turing as pivotal
figures, with the opposition of body and soul at
the core of their thinking:
Each man’s cultural milieu provided fresh meaning
for this opposition: Augustine struggled to
maintain his ideals of Christian asceticism,
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/177
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Descartes described the soldier’s soul overcoming
his body’s fear as the Thirty Years’ War raged, and
Turing idealized disembodied thought as he
suffered homophobic oppression in modern
England (1997, p. 103).
This means, for Agre, that there is a historical
tradition and discourse sustaining the practices of
contemporary computational approaches, so by
no means can they be said to sustain themselves
exclusively on technical terms. The latter view is
not only naïve but also dishonest. But
unfortunately, Agre sees that computer science is
utterly oblivious to “its intellectual contingency
and recast itself as pure technique” (idem). This is
the reason why Agre castigates this forgetfulness
of the assumptions running deep in AI, which
more often than not are compensated for, put
aside, and substituted by the formalist attempt to
cleanse computational programs of the
‘inexactness’ of natural language, and to strip AI
altogether of its historical and cultural
underpinnings. It is by virtue of not paying
attention to how their scientific practices are
constituted that formalists attempt to liberate
computational work precisely from the unruliness
and imprecision of vernacular language, which
appears foreign and annoying to their technical
field. Moreover, “they believed that, by defining
their vocabulary in rigorous mathematical terms,
they could leave behind the network of
assumptions and associations that might have
attached to their words through the
sedimentation of intellectual history” (Agre 2002,
p. 131). This is why Agre believes such an attempt
should not be countenanced any longer but rather
it should be confronted by means of a ‘critical
technical practice:’ the kind of critical stance that
would guide itself by a continually unfolding
awareness of its own workings as a historically
specific practice (1997, p. 22). As such, “it would
accept that this reflexive inquiry places all of its
concepts and methods at risk. And it would
regard this risk positively, not as a threat to
rationality but as a promise of a better way of
doing things” (Agre 1997, p. 23). 
This critical technical practice proposed by Agre
has clear overtones oscillating amid an immanent
critique, on the one hand, and an ‘epistemological
electroshock therapy’ toward situating scientific
knowledge (Haraway 1988), on the other. Indeed,
Agre’s view might appear problematic if it is ill-
construed as confusing or ambiguous, since it can
be seen both as a critique from within—accepting
the basic methodology and truth-claims of
computer science, peppered with internal
disputes against the more obviously invalid and
politically loaded claims—and as a critique from
without—recognizing the ultimate cultural
contingency of all claims to scientific truth
(Sengers 1995, p. 151). Nevertheless, it is crucial
for Agre to present his work as neither an
internalist account of AI, nor as a philosophical
study about AI, but as “actually a work of AI: an
intervention within the field that contests many of
its basic ideas while remaining fundamentally
sympathetic to computational modeling as a way
of knowing” (1997, p. xiv). Agre finds it more
daring to intervene in the field and show
practically how critical technical views might help
develop better artificial systems. Both the critical
intervention on the field and the fundamental
sympathetic posture deserve, furthermore, a
separate explanation.  
With regard to the critical intervention, Agre
notes that there is a certain mindset when it
comes to what ‘computer people’ believe—and
this is, of course, Agre’s niche—regarding the
aims and scope of their own work. This belief is
not at all arbitrary or merely capricious, but rather
it must be viewed in conjunction with the very
nature of computation and computational
research in general. According to Agre,
computational research can be defined as an
inquiry into physical realization as such. Moreover,
“what truly founds computational work is the
practitioner’s evolving sense of what can be built
and what cannot” (1997, p. 11). The motto of
computational practitioners is simple: if you
cannot build it, you do not understand it. It must
be built and we must accordingly understand the
constituting mechanisms underlying its workings.
This is why, on Agre’s account, computer
scientists “mistrust anything unless they can nail
down all four corners of it; they would, by and
large, rather get it precise and wrong than vague
and right” (1997, p. 13). There is also a ‘work
ethic’ attached to this computationalist mindset: it
has to work. However, Agre deems it too narrow
to entertain just this sense of ‘work.’ Such
conception of what counts as success is also
ahistorical in that it can simply be defined as
working because the program conforms to a pre-
given formal-mathematical specification. But an AI
system can also be said to work in a wholly
different sense: when its operational workings can
be narrated in intentional terms by means of
words whose meaning goes beyond the
mathematical structures (which is, of course, a
pervasive practice in cognitive scientific
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/177
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explanations of mechanism). For example, when a
robot is said to ‘understand’ a series of tasks, or
when it is proclaimed that AI systems will give us
deeper insights about human thinking processes.
This is indeed a much broader sense of ‘work,’
one that is not just mathematical in nature, but
rather a clearly discursive construction. And it
certainly bears reminding that such discursive
construction is part of the most basic explanatory
desires of cognitive science. So in the true sense
of the words ‘build’ and ‘work,’ AI is not only
there to build things that merely work. Let us
quote at length:
The point, in any case, is that the practical reality
with which AI people struggle in their work is not
just ‘the world,’ considered as something
objective and external to the research. It is much
more complicated than this, a hybrid of physical
reality and discursive construction. The trajectory
of AI research can be shaped by the limitations of
the physical world—the speed of light, the three
dimensions of space, cosmic rays that disrupt
memory chips—and it can also be shaped by the
limitations of the discursive world—the available
stock of vocabulary, metaphors, and narrative
conventions. (Agre 1997, p. 15) 
This also gives hints as to how exogenous
discourses, like philosophy, are supposed to be
incorporated into technological practices. Agre is
of the opinion that the point is not to invoke
Heideggerian philosophy, for example, as an
exogenous authority thus supplanting technical
methods: “the point, instead, is to expand
technical practice in such a way that the relevance
of philosophical critique becomes evident as a
technical matter. The technical and critical modes
of research should come together in this newly
expanded form of critical technical consciousness”
(1997, p. xiii). The critical technical practice Agre
envisions is one “within which such reflection on
language and history, ideas and institutions, is
part and parcel of technical work itself” (2002, p.
131). More exactly, Agre confesses that his
intention is “to do science, or at least something
about human nature, and not to solve industrial
problems” (1997, p. 17). And he adds: “but I
would also like to benefit from the powerful
modes of reasoning that go into an engineering
design rationale” (idem). In such a way, Agre
pretends to salvage the most encompassing
claims of AI research—that it can teach us
something about the world and about
ourselves—by means of incorporating a self-
correcting, history-laden approach combining
both technical precision and philosophical rigor.
By expanding the comprehension of the ways in
which a system can work, “AI can perhaps
become a means of listening to reality and
learning from it” (Agre 2002, p. 141). But it is
because of its not listening to reality that, for
instance, Dreyfus (1992) launched his attacks
against AI as an intellectual enterprise.
On this account, Agre contends that merely
“lashing a bit of metaphor to a bit of mathematics
and embodying them both in computational
machinery” (1997, p. 30)—which is usually what
computer scientists come up with—will not do the
job of contributing to the understanding of
humans and their world. So framed, the approach
appears to Agre as too narrow, naïve, and a clear
way of not listening to reality. So he has a more
ambitious project: the very metaphors being
lashed to a bit of mathematics that end up in
machinery implementation must be investigated.
Both physical reality and discursive construction
must be taken into account. Although technical
languages encode a cultural project of their own
(the systematic redescription of human and
natural phenomena within the limited repertoire
of technical schemata that facilitate rational
control)—a fact which, incidentally, tends to be as
such elided—“it is precisely this phenomenon that
makes it especially important to investigate the
role of metaphors in technical practice” (Agre
1997, p. 34). At this juncture, Agre sounds
strikingly similar to Blumenberg, whose
metaphorological project “seeks to burrow down
to the substructure of thought, the underground,
the nutrient solution of systematic crystallizations;
but it also aims to show with what ‘courage’ the
mind preempts itself in its images, and how its
history is projected in the courage of its
conjectures” (2010, p. 5). For Agre too,
metaphors play a role in organizing scientific
inquiry or, to say it with Blumenbergian tones,
metaphors are by no means ‘leftover elements’
(Restbestände) but indeed ‘foundational
elements’ (Grundbestände) of scientific
discourse.[3] Clinging to Kuhnian terminology (see
Kuhn 1996), this can also be couched in terms of
the tension between normal science—with its
aseptic attitude toward reducing instability of
meaning and inconsistency via a cleansing of
elements of inexact, ambiguous nature—and
revolutionary science which makes metaphoric
leaps that create new meanings and applications
that might constitute genuine theoretical progress
(Arbib & Hesse 1987, p. 157). By showing how
technical practice is not only the result of
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technical work but also of discursive construction
and unexplained metaphors, Agre’s critical
technical practice might meet the criteria for
being considered a truly revolutionary approach in
Kuhnian terms. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this is indeed the case.
The sympathetic attitude towards computational
modeling that Agre espouses takes as its point of
departure the analysis of agent/environment
interactions which accordingly should be
extended to include the conventions and
invariants maintained by agents throughout their
activity. This notion of environment is referred to,
with clear Husserlian overtones (see Husserl 1970),
as lifeworld, and can be incorporated into
computational modeling via “a set of formal tools
for describing structures of lifeworlds and the
ways in which they computationally simplify
activity” (Agre & Horswill 1997, p. 111). From this
follows that Agre’s theoretical emphasis lies on
the concept of embedding. This means that
agents are not only to be conceived of as
embodied but more crucially as embedded in an
environment. The distinction between
embodiment and embedding can be explained as
follows:
‘Embodiment’ pertains to an agent’s life as a
body: the finiteness of its resources, its limited
perspective on the world, the indexicality of its
perceptions, its physical locality, its motility, and
so on. ‘Embedding’ pertains to the agent’s
structural relationship to its world: its habitual
paths, its customary practices and how they fit in
with the shapes and workings of things, its
connections to other agents, its position in a set
of roles or a hierarchy, and so forth. The concept
of embedding, then, extends from more concrete
kinds of locatedness in the world (places, things,
actions) to more abstract kinds of location (within
social systems, ecosystems, cultures, and so on).
Embodiment and embedding are obviously
interrelated, and they each have powerful
consequences both for agents’ direct dealings
with other agents and for their solidarity activities
in the physical world. (Agre & Horswill 1997,
111-112)
The importance for cognitive science of having a
well-developed concept of the environment is not
to be underestimated, since it seems that only
prior to a basic understanding of an agent’s
environment can a given pattern of adaptive
behavior be figured out. Taking a stride towards
defining the environment with at least a modicum
of rigor amounts to developing “a positive
theory of the environment, that is, some kind of
principled characterization of those structures or
dynamics or other attributes of the environment in
virtue of which adaptive behavior is adaptive”
(Agre & Horswill 1997, p. 113). Accordingly, Agre
and Horswill lament that AI has downplayed the
distinction between agent and environment by
fatally reducing the latter to a discrete series of
choices in the course of solving a problem, but
“this is clearly a good way of modeling tasks such
as logical theorem-proving and chess, in which the
objects being manipulated are purely formal”
(idem). AI can go on well without a well-
developed concept of the environment but only
at the price of focusing on mere toy-problems,
microworlds, and toy-tasks within such artificial
environments. It should then not come as a
surprise that the situation changes dramatically for
tasks involving physical activities, where “the
world shows up, so to speak, phenomenologically:
in terms of the differences that make a difference
forthis agent, given its particular representations,
actions, and goals.” (idem). The environmental
indexicality that is brought forward here is often
objected to by cognitivists as though agents
performed tasks without any computation
whatsoever, or as though agents inhabiting a
lifeworld lived in an adamant reactive mode. But
the point is rather that “the nontrivial cognition
that people do perform takes place against a very
considerable background of familiar and generally
reliable dynamic structure” (Agre & Horswill 1997,
p. 118). Now, precisely indexicality has been
difficult to accommodate within AI research. With
this in view, Agre has criticized the usual
assumptions of the received view in technical
practice as follows:
That perception is a kind of reverse optics
building a mental model of the world by
working backward from sense-impressions,
inferring what in the world might have
produced them.
That action is conducted through the
execution of mental constructs called
plans, understood as computer programs.
And finally, that knowledge consists in a
model of the world, formalized in terms of
the Platonic theory analysis of meaning in
the tradition of Frege and Tarski. (2002, p.
132)
The dissociation of mind and body (the founding
metaphor of cognitive science and modern
philosophy) is here at work, precisely when
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/177
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traditional AI thinks of the mind roughly as a plan
generator and the body as the executor of the
plan. Moreover, AI is so framed in terms of a
series of dissociations: mind versus world, mental
activity versus perception, plans versus behavior,
the mind versus the body, and abstract ideas
versus concrete things (Agre 2002, p. 132).
According to Agre, these dissociations are
contingent and can be considered ‘inscription
errors’ (Smith 1996): “inscribing one’s discourse
into an artifact and then turning around and
‘discovering’ it there” (Agre 2002, p. 130). And
this is not to be admired. As Nietzsche contented
in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen
Sinne (1873), when someone hides something
behind a bush and looks for it again in the same
place and finds it there as well, there is not much
to praise in such seeking and finding.
That AI research has been framed along these
contingent oppositions makes it clear that it is
part of the history of Western thought. As such,
it has inherited certain discourses from that
history about matters such as mind and world,
and it has inscribed those discourses in computing
machinery. The whole point of this kind of
technical model-building is conceptual
clarification and empirical evaluation, and yet AI
has failed either to clarify or to evaluate the
concepts it has inherited. Quite the contrary, by
attempting to transcend the historicity of its
inherited language, it has blunted its own
awareness of the internal tensions that this
language contains. The tensions have gone
underground, emerging through substantive
assumptions, linguistic ambiguities, theoretical
equivocations, technical impasses, and ontological
confusions. (Agre 2002, p. 141)
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that—for all
his philosophical acumen—Agre himself has not
been able to liberate himself from the persistence
of a representational theory of cognition, even
when his is certainly more concrete, more
historically conscious, and more enactive than the
one customarily held in the traditional view. As a
result, the latter critical concepts grouped
together conform with the motivation for
developing a concept of indexical-functional or
deictic representation (Agre & Chapman 1987;
Agre 1997), the main idea being that agents
represent objects in generic ways through
relationships to them (Agre & Horswill 1997, p.
118). On Agre’s view, what must be done is refine
the concept of representation (and not just cast it
aside) and show what kind of representational
activity is at work in interaction. Thus, the point is
to criticize the underlying view of knowledge
presupposed by the traditional theory of
representation (that knowledge is picture, copy,
reflection, linguistic translation, or physical
simulacrum of the world), while suggesting that
“the primordial forms of representation are best
understood as facets of particular time-extended
patterns of interaction with the physical and social
world” (Agre 1997, p. 222). Therefore, “the
notion of representation must undergo painful
surgery to be of continued use” (Agre 1997, p.
250). Given that this redefinition of representation
by Agre has its own quirks, it must now be
carefully explained.  
The traditional theory of representation, which has
been put into work and is thoroughly
presupposed in traditional AI research, is based
on the notion of world model. Such notion refers
to some structure that is thought to be within the
mind or machine that represents the outside
world by standing in a systematic correspondence
with it (Agre 1997, p. 223). As such, the
assumption that there is a world model being
represented by the mind is the epitome of
mentalism (Agre 1997, p. 225). Mentalism was
previously defined by Agre as the generative
metaphor pervasive in cognitive science according
to which every human being has an abstract inner
space called a ‘mind’ which clusters around a
dichotomy between outside and inside organizing
a special understanding of human existence (Agre
1997, p. 49). Marres (1989), a defender of
mentalism, defines it as the view that the mind
directs the body. Thus, on Agre’s terms, giving
preeminence to indexicality amounts to inverting
this picture, since conceding that human beings
are not minds that control bodies implies that
interaction cannot be defined “in terms of the
relationships among a mind, a body, and an
outside world” (1997, p. 234), which is
unfortunately so typical in cognitive scientific
explanations. And here the key term is indeed
interaction, understood not as the relation
between the subjective and the objective, but
rather as emerging from the actual practices
people employ to achieve reference in situ.
Indexicality “begins to emerge not merely as a
passive phenomenon of context dependence but
as an active phenomenon of context constitution”
(Agre 1997, p. 233).
David Chalmers could only table the question 
what is it like to be a thermostat? (1996, p.
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293)—thus blurring in one fell swoop the
difference between living organisms and
mechanism—by means of importing some heavy
philosophical baggage, namely the assumption
that the thermostat controls the temperature of
systems in general (not of this specific system, say
the internal combustion engine of a specific car),
or that a thermometer measures the temperature
“in room 11” (instead of here), or that one eats
with “fork number 847280380” in some cosmic
registry of forks (instead of precisely this fork I am
holding with my left hand). Quite on the contrary,
when indexicality is introduced as a constituting
factor of interaction, it turns out that “human
activities must be described in intentional terms,
as being about things and toward things, and not
as meaningless displacements of matter. Physical
and intentional description are not incomparable,
but they are incommensurable” (Agre 1997, p.
245). From this follows that the typical ascription
of intentional states to nonembedded systems is
absurd, precisely because embedding, and the
interaction deriving thereof, is the condition of
possibility of intentional comportment. The
ubiquitous character of experience suggested in
Chalmers’s classic book on the philosophy of
consciousness is also an inscription error, for it
arises from obviating the need for a proper theory
of intentionality or, to be more exact, such view
derives from the naturalization of intentionality.
When actual, concrete intentional activities are
taken off the picture, representation is no longer
connected with a lifeworld. Thus, the illusion can
be then entertained that a semantic theory merely
entails the categorization in some objective way
of the ontology of a concrete situation, before the
event of activity has taken place, or ignoring tout
court the eventual character of activity (Agre
1997, p. 232).
Incidentally, the aforementioned illusion is Agre’s
critique of the semantic theory espoused by
Barwise and Perry (1983), which, on Agre’s
criticism, comports a metaphysical realism that
obscures indexicality. According to Agre, “when a
speaker uses an indexical term such as ‘I,’ ‘you,’
‘here,’ ‘there,’ ‘now,’ or ‘then’ to pick out a
specific referent, this picking out is determined by
relations between situations; it is not an act on the
speaker” (1997, p. 233). These interactions and
how they shape situations must be clarified, since
it can be said that “interaction is central, both to
human life and to the life of any agent of any
great complexity” (Agre 1997, p. 234). Embedded
activities must be investigated in how they are
structured, as well as the sort of representing
which is most incumbent on them.
For Agre, the latter requires a proper theory of
intentionality couched within the Heideggerian
distinction between Zuhandenheit and
Vorhandenheit (SZ § 15). Traditional AI research
can be accused of having only paid attention to
present-at-hand phenomena, thus attempting to
model computationally what precisely appears
salient objectively in perception. In contrast, Agre
finds that this phenomenological distinction is
neither psychological nor mechanistic but a
description of the structure of everyday
experience that can be suitable for a new way of
computational modeling of that experience.
Preston (1993) had already explored this
Heideggerian distinction in relation to another
one: that of nonrepresentational and
representational intentionality. One could, à
la Dreyfus (2002a; 2002b), identify respectively 
Vorhandenheit with representational intentionality
and Zuhandenheit with a sort of
nonrepresentational intentionality and so proclaim
beforehand the failure of artificial systems
propounding the accomplishment of high-level
intelligence. For Agre, however, this is too radical
and, above all, too pessimistic. What is needed is
a clarification of what kinds of representation exist
and the role they play in real activities (Agre 1997,
p. 237). Herein resides the importance of delving
into experience and providing AI with a set of
tools to enrich its vocabulary and metaphors. This
is needed because “the philosophy that informs
AI research has a distinctly impoverished
phenomenological vocabulary, going no further
than to distinguish between conscious and
unconscious mental states” (Agre 1997, p. 239).
Agre is onto something more important here,
which is nothing less than making AI philosophical
again: “technology at present is covert
philosophy; the point is to make it openly
philosophical” (1997, p. 240).    
The traditional idea of representation understood
it as a model in an agent’s mind that corresponds
to the outside world through a systematic
mapping. Agre opines that AI research has been
concerned only with a partly articulated view of
representation. No wonder, then, the meaning of
representations for an agent can be determined
almost as en-soi—to use Sartre’s terminology in 
L'être et le néant (see Sartre 1984)—without any
reference being provided as to the agent’s
location, attitudes, interests, and idiosyncratic
perspective (as être-pour-soi). This is also the
reason explaining why “indexicality has been
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almost entirely absent from AI research” (Agre
1997, p. 241). Moreover, “the model-theoretic
understanding of representational semantics has
made it unclear how we might understand the
concrete relationships between a representation-
owning agent and the environment in which it
conducts its activities” (idem). On Agre’s view, the
reason why AI research has lagged behind a clear-
cut understanding of representation and
indexicality has not been its nondistinctiveness
between mechanism and human phenomena.
Notwithstanding Agre’s crucial imports from the
alien province of phenomenology, he would
nevertheless defer to Chalmers’s highly
controversial idea that experience is ubiquitous,
albeit with a caveat: the problem is not to ask
whether there is something it is like for a
thermostat to be what it is, for Agre has it that
any device that engages in any sort of interaction
with its environment can be said to exhibit some
kind of indexicality (1997, p. 241). Chalmers’s
problem is simply not to have considered exactly
which kind of intentionality might be ascribed to
artifacts like thermostats. Artifacts do have some
sort of ambience embedding. In example, “a
thermometer’s reading does not indicate
abstractly ‘the temperature,’ since it is the
temperature somewhere, nor does it indicate
concretely ‘the temperature in room 11,’ since if
we moved it to room 23 it would soon indicate
the temperature in room 23 instead. Instead, we
need to understand the thermometer as
indicating ‘the temperature here’—regardless of
whether the thermometer’s designers thought in
those terms” (idem). As Agre’s contention goes,
the point is to ascribe indexicality to artifacts. In
fact, “AI research needs an account of
intentionality that affords clear thinking about the
ways in which artifacts can be involved in concrete
activities in the world” (1997, p. 242).  
Such account of intentionality was coined by Agre
under the rubric of deictic representation as
opposed to objective representation. First, two
sorts of ontology are to be distinguished.
According to an objective ontology, individuals
can be defined without reference to activity or
intentional states. A deictic ontology, by contrast,
can be defined only in indexical and functional
terms and in relation to an agent’s location, social
position, current goals and interests, and
autochthonous perspective (Agre 1997, p. 243).
Entities entering the space of whatever interaction
with the agent, can only be understood correctly
in terms of the roles they play in the agent’s
activities. In accordance with the aforementioned
deictic notation introduced by Agre, “some
examples of deictic entities are the-door-I-am-
opening, the-stop-light-I-am-approaching, the-
envelop-I-am-opening, and 
the-page-I-am-turning. Each of these entities is
indexical because it plays a specific role in some
activity I am engaged in; they are not objective,
because they refer to different doors, stop lights,
envelopes, and pages on different occasions”
(idem). Their nonobjective character, however,
does not imply that, by contrast, indexical entities
are to be considered as subjective and, for that
matter, as phantasms or internal and intimate
qualia. The idea behind this is precisely that a
deictic ontology should not be confused with
subjective, arbitrary musings of an encapsulated
subject. In the first place, this is the ontology that
can be most properly ascribed to routine
activities. Therefore, it would be preposterous to
suggest that they are private or ineffable.
Routines and activities are realized ‘out there’ in
the world and, for that very reason, do not pertain
to an internal mental game: they are, indeed,
public. Accordingly, in routine activities the
objective character of entities with which one
copes, is not salient or important. Neither is their
‘subjective feel,’ nor the way they appear to me as
individual. That their character is deictic means
that what is most important is the role they play in
the whole of activity. Therefore, hyphenated noun
phrases like the-car-I-am-passing or
the-coffee-mug-I-am-drinking-with are not mental
symbols in the cognitivist sense. They designate
“not a particular object in the world, but rather a
role that an object might play in a certain time-
extended pattern of interaction between an agent
and its environment” (Agre 1997, p. 251).
Agre’s alternative way of conceiving of activity
and the express purpose of modeling it
computationally is very attractive. As a matter of
engineering, the leading principle is that of
machinery parsimony: “choosing the simplest
machinery that is consistent with known
dynamics” (Agre 1997, p. 246). This view explicitly
contrasts with the emphasis on expressive and
explicit representation typical of traditional AI,
with all the inherent difficulties of programming
beforehand, as scripts, all the situations an
artificial agent might encounter when coping with
the world. By clear contrast with traditional AI,
“the principle of machinery parsimony suggests
endowing agents with the minimum of knowledge
required to account for the dynamics of its
activity” (Agre 1997, p. 249). In such a way, Agre’s
approach also resonates with Brooksian tones (see
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Brooks 1999) of removing ‘intelligence’ and even
‘reason’ from the picture in order to render an
account of interactive representation. Moreover,
Agre sees deictic representation as changing the
traditional view altogether since it presents us
with the possibility, not of expressing explicitly
and in every detail objective states of affairs, but
of participating in them: “conventional AI ideas
about representation presuppose that the
purpose of representation is to express
something, but this is not what a deictic
representation does. Instead, a deictic
representation underwrites a mode of relationship
with things and only makes sense in connection
with activity involving those things” (1997, p. 253).
However, the objection may be raised that such a
deictic approach violates the grand spirit of AI
which seeks greater explicitness of representation
and broader generality, since Agre’s formula for
design might simply contribute to model only
special-purpose—and thusly limited—devices. But
Agre responds that “the conventional conception
of general-purpose functionality is misguided: the
kind of generality projected by current AI practice
(representation as expression, thought as search,
planning as simulation) simply cannot be realized”
(1997, pp. 249-250).  
This is, of course, not just a series of theoretical
postulates urged by Agre, since he distinguishes
amongst levels of analysis (1997, pp. 27-28).
The reflexive level, which has been already
exhibited in the previous pages of this exposition,
provides ways for analyzing the discourses and
practices of technical work. Given that technical
language is unavoidably metaphorical, the
reflexive level permits one to let those metaphors
come to the surface and thus can they be taken
into account when technical work encounters
trouble in implementation. On the 
substantive level, the analysis is carried out with
reference to a particular technical discipline, in
this case AI. But Agre is primarily interested in
proceeding, on top of the reflexive and
substantive levels, on a technical level, in order to
explore “particular technical models employing a
reflexive awareness of one’s substantive
commitments to attend to particular reality as it
becomes manifest in the evolving technical work”
(1997, p. 28). On Agre’s view, traditional AI
practitioners have not conscientiously attended to
this partitioning of levels of analysis. Particularly,
the reflexive level that prescribes an awareness of
the role of metaphors in technical work has been
disdained, as though AI researchers could simply
bootstrap their way to technical success without
being aware of the underlying metaphors
pervading their work. For Agre, this is particularly
problematic because “as long as an underlying
metaphor system goes unrecognized, all
manifestations of trouble in technical work will be
interpreted as technical difficulties and not as
symptoms of a deeper, substantive problem”
(1997, p. 260).
As an exemplary case of technical work based on
the aforementioned levels of analysis, Agre
presents Pengi, a program designed by Chapman
and Agre (1987) in the late 1980s under the rubric
of being an implementation of a theory of activity.
Pengi is a penguin portrayed in the commercial
computer game Pengo, who finds itself in a maze
made up of ice blocks that is surrounded by an
electric fence. The maze is also inhabited by
deadly bees that are to be avoided at all costs by
Pengi and the task of the player is to maintain
Pengi alive and defend it from such perils coming
along the way. As defense, the bees can be killed
by crushing them with a moving ice block or by
kicking the fence while they are touching it. This
momentarily stuns the bees and they can be
crushed by simply walking over them. Agre argues
that Pengo is an improvement on the blocks
world, although it obviously fails to capture
numerous elements of human activity. What is
important is the combination of goal-directedness
and improvisation involved in the game, from
which Agre hopes to learn some computational
lessons. First of all, Agre and Chapman did not
attempt to implement in advance everything they
knew about the game, thus contradicting the
mapping out beforehand which is typical in
traditional AI systems. The point is to see Pengi as
relating to the objects that appear in its world,
not in terms of their resemblance to mental
models which were beforehand programmed, but
solely in terms of the roles they play in the
ongoing activity. As such, what Agre and
Chapman attempted to program was actually
deictic representations:
the-ice-cube-which-the-penguin-I-am-
controlling-is-kicking,
the-bee-I-am-attacking,
the-bee-on-the-other-side-of-this-ice-cube-
next-to-me, etc.  
 
At any rate, Agre does not argue that this simple
system can be regarded as intelligent: “Pengi
does not understand what it is doing. No
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computer has ever understood to any significant
degree what it was doing” (1997, p. 301). But the
bottom line is straightforward enough to explain:
the game constituting Pengi’s world as agent is
not made up of present-at-hand entities and
processes, but more importantly of possibilities
for action that require appropriate responses from
the agent. This shows Agre’s understanding of
ready-to-hand entities as no entities at all, but as
possibilities for action and subsequent responses
to the demands of the situation at hand. Given
that these possibilities for action are not objects
at all and that usually this sort of open stance for
responding skillfully to environmental challenges
does not appear in propositional referring, it is
understandable that they have been rather elusive
for programmers. After all, how can one program
possibilities for action, since the focus is not on
this particular object or the other but rather on
the movement constituting the towards-which for-
the-sake-of-which? The wellspring of this
movement is all the more elided because, as
Heidegger has it, precisely what is closest to us
ontically is ontologically (and for that very reason)
that which is farthest (SZ § 5, p. 15). This has been
Agre’s task, namely: to attempt to reveal the
ontological dimension by means of technological
implementation that does not obfuscate it but
that rather embraces it. By programming deictic
representations instead of just objective ones,
Agre argues, computational programs can learn
this fundamental lesson: what was lacking in
traditional AI systems was precisely a model to
envision a specific relationship between machinery
and dynamics based on the concept of
interaction. This lesson, so the argument goes,
can gradually dispel the need for mentalist
approaches.
        
Conclusion
It should be noted that Agre was clearly
influenced by Dreyfus’s early critique of artificial
reason (see Dreyfus 1992) but his path was
individually constructed and his insights were also
supported by different motivations. What is
perhaps more interesting is his willingness to go
on and program something, and this after
researching with seriousness the history of the
philosophy of mind and drawing even upon
continental sources. Dreyfus credits him with
expounding the philosophical debate and even
with understanding Zuhandenheit better than he
himself did, since for Agre ready-to-hand is not a 
what but a for-what (2007, p. 252). Dreyfus has it
that Agre was able to show how Heidegger wants
to get at something more basic than simply a class
of objects: equipment (Zeug). The entire point of
the equipmental character of things in the world is
not that they are entities with a function
feature—this was Dreyfus’s pre-Agrean
interpretation of Zeug and
Zeugzusammenhang—but rather that they open
up possibilities for action, solicitations to act, and
motivations for coping; an idea that Dreyfus takes
admittedly from Agre’s endeavors towards
modeling Zuhandenheit on the basis of deictic
intentionality. Nevertheless, Dreyfus is of the
opinion that in attempting to program ready-to-
hand, Agre succumbs to an abstract
objectification of human practice, because
affordances—inasmuch as they are not objects
but the in-between interaction in which no subject
nor object is involved—are not amenable to
programming. That they are not is not something
Agre seems to fully understand, and this is why he
thinks that somehow deictic representations must
be involved in human understanding. According
to Dreyfus, “Agre’s Heideggerian AI did not try to
program this experiential aspect of being drawn
in by an affordance. Rather, with his deictic
representations, Agre objectified both the
functions and their situational relevance for the
agent. In Pengi, when a virtual ice cube defined
by its function is close to the virtual player, a rule
dictates the response (e.g., kick it). No skill is
involved and no learning takes place” (2007, p.
253). It must be admitted that a virtual world is
not even slightly comparable with the complex
dynamics of the real world. In a virtual world, the
dynamics of relevance are determined
beforehand, so a program like Pengi simply
cannot account for the way human beings cope
with new relevancies. Dreyfus concludes that Agre
“finesses rather than solves the frame problem.
Thus, sadly, his Heideggerian AI turned out to be
a dead end. Happily, however, Agre never
claimed he was making progress towards building
a human being” (2007, p. 253).
Agre’s contribution consists in his attempt to
program Zuhandenheit instead of Vorhandenheit.
That this can be made is, however, highly
controversial. Certainly, what is deeply
contentious is not that phenomenological insights
can be brought to bear on cognitive science for a
critical technical practice like the one Agre
requires, but rather the assumption that the
experiential dimension which phenomenology has
revealed can be programmable. According to
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Heidegger, “the essence of Dasein lies in its
existence” (SZ § 9, p. 42), which does not imply
any “‘properties’ present-at-hand of some entity
which ‘looks’ so and so and is itself present-at-
hand” (idem). To exist as Dasein, then, implies
that one’s own existence has to be partly
constructed, for existence is not already given and
therefore is no program that can be run by any
kind of hardware (Capurro 2004). So the
Heideggerian Sichöffnende und Offene is perhaps
not amenable to programming. To say it with
Heideggerian overtones: programing can only be
ontic but not ontological, since if the ontological
were susceptible to programing, it would not be
ontological. Agre has attempted to program
routine activities and in doing so he has
pragmaticized Dasein. But Heidegger himself
warned specifically against this line of construing
his philosophy, which reduces it to mere practical
everyday activity:
 
I attempted in Being and Time to provide a
preliminary characterization of the phenomenon
of world by interpreting the way in which we at
first and for the most part move about in our
everyday world. There I took my departure from
what lies to hand in the everyday realm, from
those things that we use and pursue, indeed in
such a way that we do not really know of the
peculiar character proper to such activity, and
when we try to describe it we immediately
misinterpret it by applying concepts and
questions that have their source elsewhere. That
which is so close and intelligible to us in our
everyday dealings is actually and fundamentally
remote and unintelligible to us. In and through
this initial characterization of the phenomenon of
world the task is to press on and point out the
phenomenon of world as a problem. It never
occurred to me, however, to try and claim or
prove with this interpretation that the essence of
man consists in the fact that he knows how to
handle knives and forks or use the tram. (GA
29/30, pp. 262-263)
 
In conclusion, it must be noted that the reception
of Heidegger’s philosophy in cognitive science, in
particular, and the use of phenomenological
notions for enriching the cognitive landscape, in
general, is not merely the putting into work of
those insights but more often than not also a 
translation of those terms into cognitive ones.
With this translation, something fundamentally
phenomenological gets lost. Agre’s work here
discussed is a prominent example of how
Heidegger’s reception is rather ‘analytic’:
‘analytic’ not only in the sense that Heideggerian
philosophy is appropriated by analytic-trained
Anglo-American philosophers or, in this case, by
an MIT-trained engineer, but also in the decisive
sense that the Heideggerian philosophy which is
appropriated for the purposes of advancing the
new paradigm of cognition, pays only attention to
specific parts of Division I of Sein und Zeit; parts
which, in the same vein, are also appropriated
very selectively. The reception is ‘analytic’ in that
it constitutes a very schematic version of
Heidegger taking precisely his thought out of
context (Rehberg 2012, p. 160).
However, Agre’s work is full of important insights,
the most important of which is his demand that
technical practice be aware of the philosophical
metaphors pervading research in technological
implementation. 
 
[1] The Red Rock Eater News Service was a
popular electronic mail service organized by Agre
that was active in the mid 1990s, credited as a
model for many of today’s political blogs and
online newsletters. See online:
<http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/rre.html>.
Retrieved August 20, 2014.
[2] In the informal essay, ‘Critical Thinking for
Technical People,’ (originally an email message for
the subscribers of the Red Rock Eater News
Service), Agre tells the story “about how I became
(relatively speaking, and in a small way) a better
person through philosophy.”
[3] It must be noted that, for the sake of the
argument, reference is here made to early
Blumenberg (2010) and his project of tracing
absolute metaphors as those Grundbestände that
cannot be conceptually reduced (nicht in
Begrifflichkeit aufgelöst werden können) but
rather function as constituting a catalytic sphere
from which the universe of concepts continually
renews itself.    
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